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I. Introduction 
As the baby boomer generation ages, nations across the globe must 
face the increasing costs associated with supporting a growing elderly 
population.
1
 Unlike many nations, the United States is fortunate that a large 
portion of this burden will fall on the shoulders of world’s largest pool of 
private retirement assets.
2
 However, of the 130 million Americans 
depending on employer provided private pensions, over 51 percent bear the 
risk of facing a reduced standard of living in retirement;
3
 the prospects are 
especially bleak for minority retirees.
4
 One result of the modern American 
trend toward adopting defined contribution pension schemes is that 
employees now have greater control over their pension’s investment 
success in that they can now select from a pool of employer provided 
investment options. One inherent drawback to this increased employee 
control is that, unlike the previous system under which the employers were 
required to maintain either insurance of a specific reserve fund in case of 
loss, the employees now bear the risk of a poor return.
5
 This decision to 
                                                                                                     
 1. See JAMES C. CAPRETTA, GLOBAL AGING AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC 
PENSION SYSTEMS: AN ASSESSMENT OF REFORM EFFORTS IN TWELVE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
1 (2007), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pension_profile.pdf (examining 
the problems facing, and current retirement infrastructure of, twelve different developed 
nations).  
 2. See id. at 48 (explaining the problems facing multiple developing nations 
regarding the increasing number of retirees globally and noting that the United States is 
uniquely situated due to possession of the world’s largest private pension system).  
 3. See John C. Scott, Are Americans Losing The Chance To Retire Comfortably?, 
Scholars Strategy Network (2012), available at http://www.scholarsstrategy 
network.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_scott_on_private_retirement_plans.  
pdf (explaining that the three major sources of retirement funding in the United States 
comes from Social Security, individual earnings and savings, and pension benefits and 
that three out of every five people in the active work force rely, at least in part, on a 
private employer retirement plan).  
 4. See id. (explaining that African American households are disproportionately 
affected by the increased instability in retirement savings).  
 5. See id. (explaining that the major effect of the modern shift from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans is that the burden of risk is shifted from the employer to the plan 
enrollee).  
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place the burden-of-risk exclusively on plan enrollees invokes memories of 
the social injustices that pervaded the pre-Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA)
6
 pension system and increases retirement instability 
for the millions of low-income households that lack the financial literacy 
required for prudent investment.
7
 Faced with the prospect of losing their 
retirement security, more and more prospective retirees are choosing to use 
stock drop lawsuits in a last ditch attempt to recover pension plan losses 
incurred from the selection of imprudently provided employer investment 
options.
8
 With this increased focus on litigation, comes a fundamental 
question: Are these retiree stock drop plaintiffs entitled to a Seventh 
Amendment jury?
9
 Assuming one believes that juries may be swayed by the 
relative financial resources of the opposing parties, an affirmative answer to 
this question could significantly increase a plaintiff’s chances of successful 
recovery and might represent a small step toward softening the social 




As this Note will discuss, the availability of an ERISA jury trial boils 
down to whether the relief sought can be categorized as arising at law or in 
equity. In an attempt to resolve this question, courts have focused on the 
                                                                                                     
 6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000)). 
 7. See infra Part II (discussing several of the administrative risks associated with the 
largely unregulated pre-1974 private pension system and the destabilizing social effect of 
insufficient retirement security).  
 8. See VANGUARD CONSULTING, MITIGATING FIDUCIARY LIABILITY FOR DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLAN INVESTMENT DECISIONS 1–7 (2013), available at 
https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/mitigating_fiduciary_liability.pdf (explaining that 
an increased number of high profile “stock drop” class action suits had arisen against plan 
fiduciaries for poor plan provided investment options in defined contribution plans and 
discussing several strategies for reducing plan fiduciary liability); see also MORGAN LEWIS, 
WHITE PAPER: SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE APPLICABILITY OF THE ‘PRUDENCE PRESUMPTION” 
IN ERISA STOCK CASES: ESOP AND 401(K) PLAN SPONSORS AND FIDUCIARIES, TAKE NOTES 1 
(2013) (explaining that more than 200 ERISA employer “stock drop” class action lawsuits 
have been filed alleging that plan fiduciaries breach their ERISA duties of prudence and 
loyalty by allowing participants to invest in employer stock). 
 9. See infra Part V.  
 10. See Michael McCabe, Jr., Comment, The Right To A Jury In Benefit Recovery 
Actions Brought Under ERISA Section 502(A)(1)(B), 20 U. BALT. L. REV. 479 (1991) (“The 
importance of a jury trial to the plaintiff becomes obvious if one believes that the jury may 
be swayed by the relative financial resources of the opposing parties.”); See e.g., J. FRANK, 
COURTS ON TRIAL 111, 114, 121 & n.9 (1950) (discussing external factors which might sway 
jury opinion).  
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fact that several modern Supreme Court cases addressing ERISA’s remedial 
regime are viewed as narrowing the definition of “equitable relief.”
11
 While 
the reasoning of these cases received some criticism, other scholars 
speculate that claims that were previously believed to be purely equitable 
under the old definition of “equitable relief” might now fall outside the 
court’s narrower definition and, as a result, constitute “legal relief” entitled 
to a Seventh Amendment jury trial.
12
 Despite a general consensus that the 
majority of ERISA’s remedial provisions do not support a jury trial, little 
scholarly analysis addresses this question in the context of section 502(a)(2) 
stock drop actions.
13
 This Note will investigate the availability of a stock 
drop jury trial through a case study and critique of the recent Missouri 
District Court ruling Hellman v. Cataldo,
14
 in which the court held that the 
Supreme Court’s new narrow definition of “equitable relief” required 




This Note’s examination begins with a review of the social justice 
concerns that underpin the modern ERISA system and a brief study of the 
common law of trusts, which together facilitate the Note’s first 
conclusion—trust law is fundamental to the foundation of the ERISA 
                                                                                                     
 11. See generally Thomas P. Gies & Jane R. Foster, Leaving Well Enough Alone: 
Reflections on the Current State of ERISA Remedial Law, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 449 
(2009) (discussing the narrowing of the definition of “equitable relief” by the Supreme Court 
in cases addressing ERISA section 502(a)(3)). 
 12. See Andrew T. Kusner, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, and The ERISA Liability Of 
The Professional Service Provider, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 273, 282–85 (1994) 
(discussing the narrowing consequences of the Supreme Court equating the definition of 
“appropriate” in section 409(a) to “typically”). 
 13. Compare Denise Drake Clemow & Lisa Hund Lattan, ERISA Section 510 Claims: 
No Right To A Jury Trial Can Be Found, 73 NEB. L. REV. 756 (1994) (focusing on the 
equitable foundations of the ERISA remedial provisions and concluding that no right to a 
jury trial exists for an action brought under ERISA section 510), with Amy Nixon, Note, 
Employee Benefits: ERISA Enhanced Benefit Claims And The Seventh Amendment: No 
Common Ground in The Tenth Circuit—Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 52 OKLA. L. 
REV. 665 (1999) (arguing that some claims brought under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) are 
entitled to a jury trial because they seek “legal relief”). 
 14. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CV02177, 2013 WL 4482889, *1 (E.D. Mo., 
Aug. 20, 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial because the remedy 
sought was substantively one for “legal relief” under the modern precedent of the Supreme 
Court). 
 15. See id. at *4 (basing its conclusion based upon the Great-West test and 
restitutionary distinction between restitutionary legal relief and traceable equitable 
restitution).  




 This Note will next examine the line of Supreme Court 
cases that courts use to determine whether a claim is equitable or legal for 
purposes of the Seventh Amendment and ERISA.
17
 Third, our case study 
begins with a summary of Hellman v. Cataldo, in which a Missouri district 
court found that the 401(k) pension plan beneficiary plaintiff was 
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.
18
 Finally, after examining the District 
Court’s reasoning in Hellman, this Note will examine several important 
questions that emerge from the opinion’s reasoning and ultimately conclude 
that, despite ERISA’s social injustice origins, no constitutional jury trial 




II. History of ERISA 
Congress passed ERISA in 1974 to protect employees enrolled in 
private employer benefit plans from the under-inclusive and discriminatory 
practices that previously rendered such plans an unreliable source of 
retirement security.
20
 Prior to 1974, “workers were often subject to 
significant pension plan vesting provisions . . . [and] premature plan 
termination[s]” which often resulted in either complete or partial loss of 
benefits.
21
  In addition, conflicting state schemes and an absence of national 
oversight frequently facilitated administrative abuse and mismanagement of 
plan assets.
22
 The inherent risk associated with deferral of pension 
payments far into the future became known as “default risk” and those that 
resulted from insufficient regulatory oversight became known as 
                                                                                                     
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See Chase A. Tweel, Retirement Saving In The Face of Increasing Longevity: The 
Advantages of Deferring Retirement, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 103, 106–107 (2010) (noting 
that public opinion eventually “coalesced around the idea of federal protection of pensions 
based on concerns about mismanagement of assets, forfeiture of pension rights, and default 
by failing businesses”); see also ERISA, § 2, 29 U.S.C. §1001 (noting growth in popularity 
of private pension plans as one of the reasons for setting a national regulatory standard). 
 21. Jack E. Morris, Small Employers and Group Health Insurance: Should ERISA 
Apply?, 52 LA. L. REV. 971, 977 (1992).  
 22. See id. (highlighting the need to “protect workers from pension plan abuses and 
employers from multiple and conflicting state regulations” as some of the problems in the 
pre-1974 private pension system).  




  Both forms of risk were especially harmful to low-
income households that, unlike wealthier segments of the population, were 
exclusively reliant on their pensions for retirement savings.
24
 As a result, 
several aspects of the pre-ERISA pension system were viewed as socially 
unjust. This inequity was eventually brought to national prominence as a 
result of the economic downturn of the Great Depression,
25
 increased 
utilization of private pensions as an alternative form of compensation after 
World War II,
26




The Studebaker incident operates as the classic example of the type of 
Pre-ERISA private pension plan deficiencies that contributed to a public 
outcry for reform.
28
  Studebaker’s closure of its plant in South Bend, 
Indiana resulted in a pension plan default.
29
  Because the plan was funded 
on an ongoing basis, the trust ended up “$15,000,000 short of being able to 
                                                                                                     
 23. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s 
Trial Of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2003) 
(“ERISA was primarily designed to protect pension plan participants and beneficiaries 
against two hazards, default risk and administrative risk.”).  
 24. See Stuart N. Alperin et al., The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539, 547 (1975) (explaining that 
inequalities with the pre-1974 pension system resulted in workers realizing that the pensions 
they had relied upon failed to materialize by their time of retirement). 
 25. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted? The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade, in SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON 
AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1,2 (Comm. Print 1984).[hereinafter Gordon] (“By the onset of the 
Great Depression, of the 1930’s, many private pension plans were bankrupt[,] . . . . insecure, 
inflexible and discriminatory.”). 
 26. See id. at 3 (identifying war-time tax incentives and wage-price controls as two 
reasons that “both management and labor rechanneled pressures for higher wage rates into 
fringe benefits”).  
 27. See id. at 8 (describing that closure of the facility resulted in failure of the private 
pension plan and that many blue collar employees “lost some or all of their vested 
pensions”). 
 28. See James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 684 
(2001) (describing the pension plan failure as a “focusing event” which served as a vivid 
symbol of the hazards regulation aimed to redress and which would be invoked “again and 
again in the decade before Congress passed ERISA”).  
 29. See id. at 729–30 (noting that years of fiscal decline, recent company bankruptcy, 
and closure of the South Bend plant rendered the fate of the pension plan “a forgone 
conclusion” and that one cause of the insolvency was the fact that the pension plan was a 
funded on an ongoing basis). 
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fund the company’s pension promises to 4,392 present and former 
employees.”
30
  As a result, nearly 4,400 plan beneficiaries prior to 
retirement age, including many whose pension rights had already vested, 
either completely lost, or lost significant portions of, their anticipated 
benefits.
31
  The incident provided an ideal opportunity to get lawmakers to 
seriously consider reform and, as one Capitol Hill staffer put it, was viewed 
as “the most glorious story of failure in the business.”
32
  Understanding the 
prevalence of these inequities in the pre-1974 pension system is 
fundamental to an acute appreciation of the role that trust law ultimately 
came to play in the modern ERISA framework.
33
 
Two years prior to the Studebaker incident, in an effort to address the 
problems in the private employer pension system, President Kennedy 
established the Commission on Money and Credit (Commission) to 
examine “private pension plans and [make] a series of recommendations 
concerning their regulation.”
34
 Three years after being established, the 
Commission put forward a series of recommendations including: the 
imposition of uniform minimum vesting standards,
35
 uniform mandatory 
minimum funding levels,
36
 and, in an effort to address plan 
mismanagement, “greater supervision over the investment of pension fund 
assets.”
37
  After roughly a decade of debate, and with the purpose of 
enacting many of the reforms identified by the Commission, Congress 
passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”); 
President Gerald Ford signed the Act into law on September 2, 1974.
38
  
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 730. 
 31. See id. at 731 (“Vested employees less than sixty years of age . . . received a lump 
sum payment worth about 15% of the value of their pension . . . . [while] employees under 
forty [] got nothing.”).  
 32. Id. at 686. 
 33. See infra Part II, Section B.  
 34. Gordon, supra note 25, at 7.  
 35. See Gordon id. at 9 (proscribing “mandatory minimum vesting standards” for 
employees at fifteen and twenty years of continuous employment). 
 36. See id. (recommending that “all accrued benefit liabilities be amortized” over a 
thirty year period with a required certification process every three years to insure actuary 
compliance).  
 37. Id. at 7–8.  
 38. See Wooten, supra note 28, at 739 (observing that President Ford’s signature came 
nearly a decade after the Studebaker shutdown ensured Congress would take a hard look at 
the pre-1974 private pension plan problems that the case eventually “came to symbolize”).  
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A. Scope & Structure of ERISA 
ERISA attempts to eliminate the socially unjust administrative risks 
that plagued the pre-1974 system through inclusion of a broad pre-emption 
provision that eliminates the relevance of conflicting state regulatory 
structures.
39
  Scholars have described this pre-emption provision as 
“sweeping as broadly as the English Language allows.”
40
 By establishing a 
single national regulatory scheme, Congress simplified compliance and 
eliminated widespread confusion surrounding efficient multi-state plan 
administration.
41
  The broad scope of preemption also created a “remedial 
void” in which ERISA operates as the sole source of regulation and relief.
42
 
The Act contains a broad range of substantive regulations that include 
specific disclosure requirements,
43
 participation standards, vesting 
requirements,
44
 minimum funding requirements,
45
 and fiduciary 
obligations.
46
 While no employer is required to provide retirement benefits, 
those that do must ensure that their plan complies with any applicable 
regulatory provisions.
47
 It is important to note that each of these substantive 
provisions parallel reforms suggested in the 1964 Commission report.
48
   
                                                                                                     
 39. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); see also DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON 
REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 363 (2010) (“In an apparent 
effort to federalize the field of employee benefit law, ERISA provides that it ‘shall supersede 
any and all state laws insofar as they many now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan.’”).  
 40. Langbein, supra note 23, at 1331 (quoting Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, 
ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
109, 110 (1985)).  
 41. See Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (describing how 
inconsistent state regulations could force employers to “keep certain records[,] . . . make 
certain benefits available[,] . . . process claims in a certain way[,] . . . [or] comply with 
certain fiduciary standards” in some states but not others).  
 42. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1332 (describing a “remedial void” and arguing 
the Court should be hesitant to interpret the federal protections, established to “protect plan 
participants and beneficiaries,” as providing fewer remedial options than were present under 
the prior regulatory scheme). Before ERISA, relief would have presumably been sought 
under either a state statutory scheme or the common-law of trusts. Id.  
 43. See generally ERISA §§ 101–111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1031. 
 44. See generally id. §§ 201–211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1061.  
 45. See generally id. §§ 301–306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–1086.  
 46. See generally id. §§ 401–414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114. 
 47. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 6–7 (discussing how, unlike Social Security 
and Medicare, retirement and welfare plans are optional for employers).  
 48. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (listing minimum vesting standards, 
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ERISA pension plans come in two forms: the defined benefit plan
49
 
and the defined contribution plan.
50
 Defined contribution plans place all 
contributions to the plan into one or more personalized accounts and benefit 
payments vary depending on the value of participant’s individualized 
account.
51
 As such, defined contribution plan beneficiaries’ retirement 
benefits are directly affected by the investment success or failure of the 
funds in their personalized account.
52
 In contrast, defined benefit plans 
include any pension plan that does not fall within the defined contribution 
scheme.
53
 While this broad definition means that defined benefit plans can 
vary widely in structure, the traditional example involves a single mass 
employer held account subject to statutory funding requirements and over 
which the employer has exclusive investment control.
54
 The modern private 
pension system experienced a shift from defined benefit plans, common at 
the statute’s inception, to defined contribution plans.
55
 As a result, a 
majority of contemporary private plans consist of individualized accounts 
and participant driven investment; a scheme that ultimately forces 
“employees [to] shoulder all the risks [of loss]” and increases the risk of 
                                                                                                     
minimum funding levels, and fiduciary obligations to avoid administrative and default risk 
as potential solutions to pre-1974 deficiencies).  
 49. See ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2012) (defining “”defined benefit 
plan”). 
 50. See id. at § 1002(34) (defining “defined contribution plan”). 
 51. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 16 (explaining that the benefits payable 
under the plan depend on the amount of the total between (1) employer contributions, 
(2) employee contributions, (3) forfeitures from termination of employment prior to vesting, 
and (4) beneficiary’s share of plan’s investment earnings or losses).  
 52. See id. at 17 (explaining that defined contribution plans can never be underfunded 
or overfunded because the total value of participant’s account is always equal to the total 
value of the plan assets).  
 53. See id. (explaining that, under a traditional defined benefit plan, the plan itself 
specifies the benefit payable on termination of employment determined by (1) average salary 
and (2) length of employee’s service).  
 54. See id. (noting that the plan typically retains an actuary to calculate the amount 
that will be required at the employee’s retirement date and such amount depends on 
(1) amount of annual pension, (2) predicted plan investment income, (3) mortality 
assumptions, and (4) form of benefit payment).  
 55. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 
471 (2004) (explaining that a “significant reversal of historic patterns under which the 
traditional defined benefit plan was the dominant paradigm for the provision of retirement 
income” is underway). 
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In addition to the substantive regulations discussed above, ERISA also 
contains remedial provisions.
57
 Section 502(a) authorizes participants to 
bring enforcement actions where conduct violates either the employee’s 
rights or an administrator’s fiduciary obligations.
58
 The remedial provisions 







Despite the complex nature and broad scope of these provisions, Congress 
failed to address the issue of jury trial availability.
62
 
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) allows participants or beneficiaries “to 
recover benefits due” under “the terms of the plan, to enforce [their] rights 
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify [their] rights under the terms of the 
plan.”
63
  Although claims under 502(a)(1) have been largely 
uncontroversial, courts have disagreed on whether the recovery is legal or 




                                                                                                     
 56. See SCOTT, supra note 3 (explaining that neither the defined benefit nor defined 
contribution structure is “completely risk-free, but who bears the burden of risk is a key 
difference” and that under the new system an employee with sub-par investment returns is 
not guaranteed a fixed pension).  
 57. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012) (detailing remedial provisions).  
 58. Langbein, supra note 23, at 1333; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 
41, 52 (1987) (stating that ERISA’s remedial provisions constitute “one of the essential tools 
for accomplishing the stated purposes” of the federal regulatory regime).  
 59. ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2012).  
 60. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).  
 61. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2012).  
 62. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 373 (observing that ERISA fails to address 
the availability of a jury trial and that courts have been forced to determine whether the 
actions brought are legal or equitable in nature in an effort to determine whether they fall 
within the purview of the Seventh Amendment).  
 63. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012).  
 64. See Eduard A. Lopez, Equitable Remedies For Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under 
ERISA After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 331 (1997) (citing 
Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) as a case where an action for recovery 
of benefits under 502(a)(1)(B) was equitable in nature and Novak v. Anderson Corp., 962 
F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1992) as an example of a court finding it to be legal in nature); see 
also George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated For Benefit Claims Action, 25 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 361, 377 (1992) (identifying the major difference between courts that found 
“benefits-due lawsuits” to be legal was that they observed a “contract-like” theory of benefit 
plans, while courts that found the suit sounded in equity regarded them as “trust-like”); Note, 
The Right To Jury Trial In Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(A)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 737, 757 (1983) (arguing that no jury trial should be available in section 
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ERISA section 502(a)(3) allows plan participants, beneficiaries, or 
fiduciaries “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any [ERISA] 
provision” or “to obtain other appropriate relief [which may be necessary 
for redress].”
65
  The Supreme Court has characterized section 502(a)(3) “as 
a catch-all provision giving the Court the flexibility to fashion any remedy 
necessary to prevent injustice.”
66
  As Part II of this Note will discuss, the 
remedies available under the “catch-all” provision are considerably 
constricted by the Court’s narrowing definition of “equitable relief.”
67
   
ERISA section 502(a)(2), the focus of this Note, allows the Secretary 
of Labor or a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a civil 
action “for appropriate relief under” section 409(a).
68
 Section 409(a) 
provides that any plan fiduciary “who breaches any of [his] responsibilities, 
obligations, or duties . . . shall be personally liable to make good to such 
plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach . . . and shall be 
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate.”
69
 Similar to section 502(a)(1), courts frequently disagree over 
whether the relief provided by section 502(a)(2) entitles the plaintiff to a 
jury trial, i.e., whether the relief is legal or equitable.
70
  At least one district 
court has cited to the narrowing definition of ERISA “equitable relief” as 




                                                                                                     
502(a)(1)(B) actions because the plan-enforcement actions are merely affirmative 
injunctions in disguise and thus within the pre-merger domain of equity). 
 65. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012). 
 66. PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 359. 
 67. See infra Part II. However, Yale Law School’s John Langbein criticized the Court 
for failing to fully appreciate the core role that common-law trust plays as a foundation of 
ERISA and for failing to realize that some forms monetary damages were historically 
“equitable” in nature. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1320–21. 
 68. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2012).  
 69. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 70. Compare Abbot v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-cv-0701-MJR, 2007 WL 
2316481 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) (finding that analogous actions at common law were 
equitable and thus the action brought under 502(a)(2) pursuant to section 409(a) was 
equitable in nature for purposes of the Seventh Amendment); with Chao v. Meixner, No. 
1:07-cv-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2007) (finding that the 
plaintiff’s 502(a)(2) action sought monetary relief for losses to the plan and sounded “at law 
at least in part” entitling them to a jury trial).  
 71. See infra Parts III & IV (discussing the evolution of the Court’s definition of 
“equitable relief” and the Missouri District Court’s ruling in Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12-
cv-02177-AGF, 2013 WL 4482889 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 20, 2013)). 
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B. ERISA’s Trust Law Heritage 
While some ERISA regulatory provisions only affect pensions,
72
 the 
sections governing fiduciary responsibilities are broadly applicable and 
govern all ERISA benefit plans.
73
  Both legislative history and scholarly 
opinion indicate that the drafters of the fiduciary provisions intended to 
eliminate the retirement insecurity caused by the administrative risks of the 
pre-1974 system by applying “rules and remedies similar to those under 
traditional trust law.”
74
 As a result, trust law lies at the core of the ERISA 
framework and a brief historical overview of that area of law is essential to 
our analysis of the Act’s remedial provisions.
75
  
1. Origin of the Trust 
While remedies at law developed out of the early English writ system 
of resolving legal disputes, equitable remedies developed at the hands of the 
chancery courts as a supplementary source of relief.
76
 Trusts developed as 
an exclusively equitably relationship in which the possessor of legal title, 
the trustee, would hold and manage real property for the benefit of the 
possessor of equitable title, the beneficiary.
77
 Trusts eventually incorporated 
                                                                                                     
 72.  See ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. 1051(1) (2012) (addressing the coverage of 
participation and vesting requirements); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. 1081(a)(1) (2012) 
(addressing the coverage of funding requirements).  
 73. See ERISA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2012)(establishing fiduciary obligations 
without limiting applicability to a particular type of benefit plan, i.e., retirement or welfare); 
see also PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 80 (“The fiduciary standards of Title I of ERISA 
apply to all employee benefit plans, both welfare benefit plans and pension plans.”).  
 74. Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, But Is It Right? The Common Law of Trusts in 
ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW 391, 395 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 275 
(1974) as stating that “[t]he objectives of [ERISA fiduciary responsibility] provisions are to 
make applicable the law of trusts;  . . . to establish uniform fiduciary standards . . . ; and to 
provide effective remedies for breaches of trust.”); see also Langbein, supra note 23, at 
1323–25 (arguing that statutory rules such as ERISA’s mandatory trusteeship and expansive 
definition of “fiduciary” are indicative of the drafters’ intent to create fiduciary obligations 
and remedies similar to those available with common-law trusts).    
 75. See Lopez, supra note 64, at 338–39 (discussing the exclusive jurisdiction of trusts 
arising in courts of equity because of a refusal to enforce such relationships in courts at law).  
 76. See id. at 337–38 (discussing the separate development of courts of law based 
upon common-law precedent and the early chancery court basing substantive decisions on 
the kings conscious, cannon law, and ancient Roman law).  
 77. See DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
218 (2013) (observing that common law courts of King’s Bench and Common Pleas would 
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fiduciary duties whereby obligations of loyalty and care flowed from the 
trustee to his beneficiary.
78
  
Common-law trusts evolved with the passage of time to hold money in 
addition to real property.
79
  As a result, additional fiduciary obligations, 
such as the requirement to conduct duties according to the standard of a 
prudent businessman, to invest with the prudence of cautious conservatism, 
and to prevent the intermingling of trustee and beneficiary funds, 
developed.
80
 Beneficiaries possessed standing to bring a suit in chancery 
court to ensure that the trustee’s conduct remained consistent with these 
duties.
81
  In addition to enjoining conduct, in the case of wrongful sale of 
trust assets, beneficiaries could bring suit to recover the proceeds of such 
sale or, if the wrongful profits were reinvested, to follow the funds and 
recover the proceeds.
82
  Finally, beneficiaries were permitted to bring suits 
                                                                                                     
not look beyond “the simple fact of who had title”). The trust evolved from a special legal 
relationship called a use that aristocrats implemented as a mechanism to avoid the negative 
effects of wardship, which resulted from their estate escheating to the Crown when the title 
holder died before his heir reached the age of twenty-one. Id. at 216. Early attempts to avoid 
the negative effects of wardship required a permanent transfer of land to “religious orders or 
municipal organizations” with an agreement that the land was to be held for the benefit of 
the transferor or a third party. Id. at 218. While the equitable titleholder could still enjoy the 
benefits of ownership, because the new holder of legal title could not die, the land could not 
escheat and wardship was impossible. Id. at 217–18. Because courts at law would not 
recognize the legal fiction of equitable title, which was inherent to the concept of the use, 
one problem with the use was the possibility that the new titleholder would choose to move 
onto the estate and evict the individual for whom the beneficial interest in the land was held. 
Id. at 218. As a result, individuals turned to the courts of equity, which did recognize the 
legal fiction and relationship created by the use, to “do what was right and just” by either 
issuing an injunction or requiring the titleholder return legal title to the transferor. Id.  
 78. See id. at 219 (noting that “one of the most important aspects of the trust” is that 
the “trustee (legal title holder) must have active responsibilities toward the property and the 
beneficiaries”). In 1536 Parliament abolished all uses except for “active uses,” which 
contained “some sort of affirmative duties or obligations toward the land or the 
beneficiaries,” with the passage of the Statutes of Uses. Id. at 218. This legal fiction 
eventually became known as a trust and the legal duties and obligations, which were 
essential to the post-1536 survival of the active use, as fiduciary obligations. Id. at 219. 
 79. See Lopez, supra note 64, at 340 (discussing that that innovation of placing funds 
in trusts eventually led to additional fiduciary duties being placed on trustees).  
 80. See id. (citing FREDRICK W. MAITLAND, EQUITY:  A COURSE OF LECTURES 91–92, 
216–17 (2d ed. 1936) as a source illustrating the various fiduciary duties that developed with 
trust law).  
 81. See id. (noting that a trust beneficiary “could bring suit” for various purposes 
including to remove a trustee for breach of trust).  
 82. See id. (listing various mechanisms by which a trust beneficiary could enforce his 
rights under the trust).  
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in equity to hold a trustee “personally liable to restore to the trust any 
property that [was] wrongfully alienated or diminished” and “for any profits 
lost . . . as a result of [the trustee’s] breach of duty.”
83
 
2. Merger of Law and Equity 
Several decades before the creation of ERISA, the federal courts of 
law and equity merged with the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938.
84
 Merger “create[d] a single set of procedures for all 
legal claims.”
85
 One important exception to this procedural standardization 




Despite the unification of procedure, post-merger trusts continue to 





 The remedies “available for breach of trust [also 
remain] substantially the same.”
88
 For example, post-merger trust 
beneficiaries may still compel a trustee to perform his duties as trustee,
89
 
enjoin a breach of trust,
90
 or hold a trustee personally liable for losses 
incurred or profits made as a result of such breach.
91
 Thus, modern trusts 
are similar to their pre-merger predecessors in that they remain the subject 
of equitable relief.
92
   This general rule is subject to two exceptions—the 
                                                                                                     
 83. Id. 
 84. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing that the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
“govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district 
courts”); see also Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 
44 YALE L.J. 387, 387–88 (1935) (identifying the congressional grant of authority which 
would allow the Supreme Court to make rules which would govern both law and equity and 
discussing the various reasons for merger).  
 85. Lopez, supra note 64, at 341.  
 86. Id. 
 87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169–85 (1959) (listing seventeen 
separate fiduciary provisions that govern trustee conduct); see also supra note 64 and 
accompanying text (outlining pre-merger trust remedies which parallel those found in the 
most resent restatement).  
 88. Lopez, supra note 64, at 341.  
 89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199(a) (1959). 
 90. See id. § 199(b). 
 91. See id. § 199(c). 
 92. See id. § 197 (citing CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (1966) as 
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law permits concurrent legal remedies where a trustee is under a duty to 
immediately and unconditionally pay money or return a chattel to a 
beneficiary.
93
  With the above caveat however the only difference between 
pre- and post-merger breach of trust claims is that modern actions can be 
brought in federal courts that simultaneously sit in law and equity.
94
 
3. Trust Model of ERISA 
While ERISA’s vesting, participation, and funding provisions address 
issues of default risk inherent in the long-term deferral of income, the 
fiduciary provisions seek to decrease socially inequitable administrative 
risk.
95
  As such, the latter provisions seek to decrease retirement instability 
created by managerial abuse and frivolous plan investment.
96
  This is 
accomplished by making administrators accountable to the households 
harmed by their mismanagement through adoption of “rules and remedies 
similar to those under traditional trust law.”
97
  
Professor John Langbein argues that the trust origin of ERISA is 
further evidenced by the fact that section 502(a)(2) parallels the equitable 
remedies traditionally available for breach of trust.
98
 For example, Langbein 
points to the fact that trust law supports an action to recover “(1) for loss 
incurred, (2) for any profits that the trustee made in breach of trust, and 
                                                                                                     
supporting the proposition that breach of trust sounds in equity not as a breach of contract 
and thus abuse of plan administration requires an equitable remedy).  
 93. See id. §§ 198(1)–(2) (noting that these two legal remedies run concurrently with 
potential equitable relief).  
 94. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing a single mechanism to invoke jurisdiction of all 
federal courts).  
 95. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1322 (citing funding requirements as one way in 
which ERISA provisions have largely eliminated default risk by ensuring the sponsor 
contributes enough to pay plan promises on an “actuarially sound basis”).  
 96. See id. at 1323 (observing the danger that “persons responsible for managing and 
investing plan assets and paying claims may abuse their authority”, mismanage assets, or 
improperly refuse to pay benefits and terming that risk “administrative risk”).  
 97. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5038, 5076 (emphasis added); see also Langbein, supra note 23, at 1331 (quoting same 
language to support criticism of later Supreme Court cases which distance ERISA from its 
trust law base).  
 98. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1333–34 (“[I]n capsule form, trust remedy law 
allows recovery for loss, restitution of profits, and recovery of foregone gains.”).  
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(3) for any gains that would have accrued but for the breach.”
99
  Similarly, 
section 409(a), which proscribes liability for breach of ERISA fiduciary 
duties, addresses the first two methods of recovery when it provides that the 
fiduciary (1) “shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan resulting from . . . breach, and [(2)] to restore to such plan 
any profits [that] such fiduciary . . . made through use of [plan] assets” and 
the third when it permits “such other equitable or remedial relief as the 
court may deem appropriate.”
100
  Noting that no explanation exists for 
section 409’s use of the broader phrase “equitable and remedial relief” 
instead of the more precise trust standard, Langbein suggests that Congress 
meant to facilitate adaption to new problems that might arise as a result of 
applying trust remedies to ERISA benefit plans.
101
  
The cumulative take away from these trust law parallels is that 
Congress sought to eliminate the socially unjust societal harms inherent in 
an unreliable retirement system.
102
 Making plan administrators accountable 
to plan enrollees provided an important layer of protection for low-income 
households and unskilled laborers that would otherwise lack any assurance 
of retirement stability.
103
  The Supreme Court’s narrowing definition of 
ERISA “equitable relief” has drawn sharp criticism for ignoring these 
remedial goals and depriving plan participants of remedies that would be 
available if the action sounded in post-merger common-law trust.
104
  
                                                                                                     
 99. See id. at 1333 (citing AUSTIN WAKERMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)).  
 100. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012); see also id. at 1335 (arguing that both 
ERISA and trust law provide remedies for recovery of loss, recovery of profits, and recovery 
of forgone gains).  
 101. Langbein, supra note 23, at 1335.  
 102. See id. at 1323–24 (explaining that defined benefit pension plan enrollees were 
subject to administrative risk in the form of poor plan management, misuse of plan assets, 
and improper refusal to pay benefits ). 
 103. See PAMELA PERUN & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, ERISA AT 50:  A NEW MODEL FOR 
THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM 1 (2000), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
uploadedpdf/retire_4.pdf (explaining that ERISA was revolutionary in that it “established 
requirements for reporting and disclosure and standards for fiduciary responsibility, 
administration, and enforcement where previously none existed”).  
 104. See e.g., Langbein, supra note 23, at 1338–62 (providing an in-depth analysis and 
critique of the various cases addressed in Part II of this note based upon what the author 
perceived to be the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize extent of ERISA’s trust based 
origin and misconstruction of what relief was “traditionally available in equity”); see also 
Collins, supra note 74, at 396 (drawing parallel between ERISA and pre-merger trust law) .  
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III. Equitable or Legal Relief: The Jury Trial & ERISA 
With a firm understanding of ERISA’s trust law heritage in hand, Part 
III turns to examine the Supreme Court precedent on which our study case, 
Hellman v. Cataldo, relied when it determined that section 502(a)(2) 
entitles plaintiffs a constitutional jury trial.  Availability of a civil jury trial 
depends on the answer to two questions.
105
 First, whether congress 
expressly or implicitly provided for a jury in statutory framework.
106
  
Second, if congress remained silent, whether the Seventh Amendment 
nonetheless mandates a jury be made available.
107
 Because sections 409(a) 
and 502(a)(2) are silent on the issue, this Note will focus on the second 
inquiry; whether the Constitution mandates a jury trial be made available to 
retirees bringing section 502(a)(2) “stock drop” suits.
108
  
A. The Seventh Amendment 
The Seventh Amendment was passed in 1791 and provides that “[i]n 
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”
109
 In an effort to 
define “suits at common law” flexibly, the Supreme Court explained that 
                                                                                                     
 105. See McCabe, supra note 10, at 506 (concluding that in some instances jury trials 
should be made available in section 502(a)(1)(B) benefit actions after engaging in an 
examination of both the statutory test and, after finding it silent, the Seventh Amendment).  
 106. See, e.g., Allen v. United Mine Workers, 319 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1963) 
(finding an express right to a jury trial under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947); 
Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (finding an implicit statutory 
provision for a jury trial in a case brought under federal antitrust law). 
 107. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (noting that the constitutional 
analysis is only undertaken after it has been determined that federal statute cannot be 
interpreted in such a way that “the [constitutional] question may be avoided” (quoting 
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971))).  
 108. See ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2012) (lacking any language 
which addresses the availability of a jury trial); see also Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 
F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986) (noting that ERISA does not 
contain a provision addressing the right to a jury trial); PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 
373 (“Congress . . . failed to specify whether a jury could try causes of action . . . arising 
under ERISA”). If a constitutional entitlement is found, courts will likely interpret the 
language of the statute to be consistent with such provision because courts will presume that 
statutes enacted by congress were drafted in a way that is constitutionally consistent. See 
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982). 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).  
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the “phrase . . . is used in contradistinction to equity. . . . [and means] not 
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled 
proceedings, but [all] suits in which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and 
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone [are] 
recognized, and equitable remedies [are] administered.”
110
 Thus, “the 
amendment . . . embrace[s] all suits which are not of equity, . . . whatever 
might be [their] peculiar form.”
111
  
Because many modern statutory causes of action, including ERISA, 
lack a direct pre-1791 corollary, the Supreme Court developed the 
“historical test” to determine whether such actions adjudicate “legal” rights, 
i.e., whether the Seventh Amendment requires jury trial availability.
112
 The 
“historical test” makes this determination through the use of a two-step 
analysis.
113
 First, courts must “compare the statutory action to 18th century 
actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of 
law and equity.”
114
 The Court made clear that identifying the appropriate 
historically analogous cause of action “depends on the nature of the issue to 
be tried rather than the character of the overall action.”
115
 Second, courts 
must “examine the remedy sought [to] determine whether it is legal or 
                                                                                                     
 110. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) 
(emphasis in original)); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (explaining 
that, prior to the Seventh Amendment’s adoption, the jury trial was customarily only allowed 
in the English law courts as opposed to those actions brought in the 18th century courts of 
equity or admiralty). 
 111. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193; see also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 
(1962) (applying the Seventh Amendment to a statutory cause of action in trademark case); 
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (applying the Seventh Amendment to a 
statutory cause of action in an immigration case); Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting 
Co., 240 U.S. 27, 31 (1916) (applying the Seventh Amendment to a statutory cause of action 
in the antitrust context) 
 112. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 
565–66 (1990) (observing that statutory rights “unknown in the 18th century” require the 
court identify “an analogous cause of action”); see also James Fleming, Jr., Right to a Jury 
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1963) (noting that, because the Seventh 
Amendment meant to preserve the jury trial applicability as it existed at the time of the 
Amendment’s enactment, modern post-1791 statutory causes of action necessarily lack a 
direct pre-1971 parallel and thus must rely upon identifying historically analogous causes of 
action).  
 113. See Chauffers, 494 U.S. at 565 (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417–18 (1987) as a source 
which describes the goal of the “historical test” as identifying modern statutory claims that 
resolve “legal rights”).  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 569 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)).  




 Monetary relief is one example of a remedy that, 
with limited exception, was traditionally offered in courts of law.
117
  
It is important to note that the forgoing test, which serves as the 
constitutional minimum for jury trial availability, was not altered with the 
merger of law and equity.
118
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a 
neutral stance on the issue and merely provide that “the 
right[s] . . . declared in the Seventh Amendment . . . shall be preserved to 
the parties in violate.”
119
 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language 
as an attempt to preserve, not expand, the pre-merger right.
120
 Thus, 
whether the post-merger cause of action seeks to resolve equitable or legal 




B. Decisions Shaping the Post-1989 Availability of the ERISA Jury Trial 
While the law and equity distinction is important for determining the 
scope of the constitutional jury trial, it is also important for understanding 
the effect of the recent Supreme Court’s ERISA cases. Justice Scalia’s 
narrow definition of “appropriate equitable relief” brought ERISA’s 
distinction in line with the Seventh Amendment “historical test” and led to 
                                                                                                     
 116. Id. at 565.  
 117. See id. at 570–71 (noting that monetary relief might be characterized as an 
equitable remedy when (1) restitutionary, such as the disgorgement of improper profits, or 
(2) “incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief” (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 
(1987)). The Court further retreated from this statement when it noted that, it has not been 
“held that ‘any award of monetary relief is necessarily ‘legal’ relief.’” Id. (quoting Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (emphasis added)). 
 118. See Fleming, supra note112, at 686 (discussing how both the “framers of [the] 
merged systems of procedure” took a “neutralist position toward [the] jury trial” in an 
attempt to neither “contract nor expand it”). 
 119. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a).  
 120. See Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. at 565 (noting that, after the merger of law and 
equity, the court has carefully preserved the right to trial by jury in those circumstance where 
it existed prior to merger and highlighting the firm place the jury trial holds in the history of 
the United States).  
 121. See id. (“Since the merger of the systems of law and equity, the Court has 
carefully preserved the right to trial by jury where legal rights are at stake.”). However, “if a 
‘legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the legal claim, 
including all issues common to both claims, remains intact.’” Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 
412, 425 (1987) (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.11 (1974)). 
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Hellman’s ERISA stock drop jury trial award.
122
 The following is a brief 
summary and analysis of the relevant Supreme Court precedent.
123
 
1. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance v. Russell 
The Supreme Court first addressed limitations on the remedies 
available under section 502(a)(2) in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. v. 
Russell.
124
 The case involved a defined benefit disability plan beneficiary 
who, after being denied and eventually reinstated welfare benefits for a 
disabling back ailment, brought suit alleging individualized injury resulting 
from the 132 day delay in benefit disbursements.
125
 Russell claimed that the 
plan administrator’s actions constituted an actionable breach of fiduciary 
duty under sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2).
126
  
The Supreme Court disagreed and explained in a five-to-four opinion 
authored by Justice Stevens that section “409 [does not] express[ly] 
authori[ze] an award of extracontractual [or punitive] damages.”
127
 The 
Court reasoned that the language of section 409, which stated that a 
fiduciary is personally liable “‘to make good to such plan any losses to the 
plan . . . and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which 
have been made through use of assets of the plan,” evidenced a legislative 
intent to limit recovery to the plan alone.
128
 After concluding that the 
express language of section 409(a) only permitted “remedies that would 
                                                                                                     
 122. See infra Part IV (noting that both the Historical Test utilized for purposes of the 
Seventh Amendment and ERISA traditional equity inquiry effectively asked the same two-
pronged question).  
 123. See infra notes 131–185.  
 124. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (finding that 502(a)(2) 
does not support extra-contractual or punitive damages because the language of section 409 
does not provide such a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty).  
 125. See id. at 136–37 (claiming that  high-ranking company officials “(1) ignored 
readily available evidence documenting [her] disability, (2) applied unwarrantedly strict 
standards, and (3) deliberately took 132 days to process her claim”).  
 126. See id. at 134–35 (noting that the plaintiff brought suit alleging individualized 
injury not injury to the welfare plan itself and despite the fact that the plan administrator 
ensured retroactive benefits were paid in full).  
 127. Id. at 144.  
 128. See id. at 140 (quoting ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (1974) (emphasis 
added)). Also, the Court observed that “when the entire section [409] is examined, the 
emphasis on the relationship between the fiduciary and the plan as an entity becomes 
apparent.” Id.   
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protect the entire plan,” the Court refused individualized relief because 
ERISA’s “six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions” 
represented “strong evidence that Congress did not intend to 
authorize . . . remedies that it [failed to] . . . incorporate expressly.”
129
 
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan explained that, while the express 
language of section 409(a) indicated it did not support individualized extra-
contractual damages, the Court’s opinion should not be stretched to cover 
section 502(a)(3).
130
 He also took issue with the majority’s characterization 
of the ERISA scheme as “exhaustive” and argued that the statute’s remedial 
goals compelled the conclusion that section 502(a)(3)’s provision for 
“appropriate equitable relief” anticipated a broader definition through 
which courts could craft new remedies necessary to “make [each plaintiff] 
whole.”
131
 The concurrence pointed to legislative history as evidence that 
congress intended to create a  “federal common law” flexible enough to 
address novel problems in the application of trust law to a pension system 
and decrease socially unjust administrative risk.
132
  
2. Bowen v. Massachusetts 
A year after the Russell decision, Justice Scalia provided a glimpse 
into the reasoning which would shape the Court’s later opinions in Bowen 
v. Massachusetts.
133
 The case dealt with whether a federal court had 
jurisdiction to review a final order by the Secretary of Heath and Human 
                                                                                                     
 129. Id. at 146; see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571–74 (1979) 
(“[W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be 
chary of reading others into it.”). 
 130. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 151 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (discussing his worry that the “dicta in the Court’s opinion” might mistakenly be 
construed “as sweeping more broadly than the narrow ground of resolution set forth above”).  
 131. See id. at 155 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that section 502(a)(3) “can 
only be read precisely as authorizing the federal courts to ‘fine-tune’ ERISA’s remedial 
scheme”).  
 132. See id. at 156 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing the Senate Conference Report and 
deriving a congressional intent that ERISA be “regarded . . . in a similar fashion to those 
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act” (LMRA) which 
authorizes courts to fashion a body of federal law in the context of collective-bargaining 
agreements).  
 133. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913 (1988) (providing a narrower 
view of the term “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA which sharply contrasts to the 
broader definition advocated by Justice Brennan in his Russell concurrence).  
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Services, and its resolution depended upon whether the plaintiff sought 
money or specific relief.
134
 While not an ERISA opinion, the case serves as 
a preview of Justice Scalia’s understanding of the distinction between law 
and equity that underpins the analysis adopted by the Court in subsequent 
ERISA cases.
135
 Justice Scalia urged the Court to ground its legal and 
equitable relief distinction in the substance, not form, of the particular 
claim.
136
 In an attempt to contrast the “two broad categories of judicial 
relief,” he defined “damages” as “money awarded as reparation for injury 
resulting from breach of [a] legal duty . . . . [which] compensates the 
plaintiff for a loss” and contrasted that definition with “specific 
relief . . . . [which] prevents or undoes a loss.”
137
 Unlike money damages, 
which merely seek to compensate the plaintiff, specific relief involves an 
order to “return to the plaintiff [] the precise property that has been 
wrongfully taken, or [to] enjoin[] acts that would damage the plaintiff’s 
person or property.”
138
 Finally, the dissent notes “suits seeking (whether by 
judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum 
of money to the plaintiff are [usually] suits for ‘money damages.’”
139
 The 
Court’s narrower definition of “specific relief” harkens to a pre-merger 
substantive “equity” and sharply contrasts with the broader post-merger 
understanding Justice Brennan advocated in Russell.
140
  
3. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates 
The tension between Bowen’s narrower definition and the Russell 
dissent’s broader interpretation came to a head when the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 134. See id. at 882 (describing the order as “refusing to reimburse a State for a category 
of expenditures under its Medicaid program”). 
 135. See infra notes 167–217. 
 136. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. at 915–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “[i]t does not take much lawyerly inventiveness to convert a claim for payment of past 
due sum (damages) into a prayer for an injunction against refusing to pay the sum”).  
 137. Id. at 914–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 138. Id. at 915 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 139. Id. at 918–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the dissent mentions an exception 
to this general rule when the sum of money is paid for incalculable future harm instead of 
pass loss and provided the example of the threat of multiplicity of lawsuits generating no 
adequate remedy at law. Id. at 918 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 140. See supra notes137–139 (describing Justice Brennan’s suggested meaning of 
ERISA equitable relief, which, unlike Justice Scalia’s narrower pre-merger definition, 
focused on the diverse relief available to a modern trust litigant).  
REVIVAL OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUITY 447 
 
finally addressed the proper definition of section 502(a)(3) “equitable 
relief” in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.
141
 The case involved a class action 
suit by Kaiser Steel Corporation (Kaiser) pension plan beneficiaries against 
a third-party plan actuary who, after Kaiser phased out the steelmaking 
operations, failed to change the actuary tables to properly reflect the 
increased retirement costs.
142
 This failure would eventually cause the plan 
to become under-funded and the substantial loss of benefits.
143
  Because the 
plan actuary was not an ERISA plan fiduciary, the plaintiffs brought suit 
seeking to hold Hewitt Associates “liable . . . as a nonfiduciary that 
knowingly participated in the plan fiduciaries’ breach of their fiduciary 
duties” under section 502(a)(3).
144
 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought 
monetary relief for losses resulting to the plan and asked the Court to 
fashion an appropriate remedy based upon the theory that it constituted 




In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument and, after citing to Russell for the proposition that the 
Court was “unwilling to infer causes of action,” found that 502(a)(3) does 
not authorize suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who 
knowingly participate in a fiduciary’s breach.
146
 The Court reasoned that, 
while both the broader definition meaning “all relief available for breach of 
trust at common law” and narrower definition limiting available relief to 
                                                                                                     
 141. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993) (finding that the plaintiff 
could not hold the third party actuary liable under ERISA because such an action for 
compensatory monetary relief was not available under section 502(a)(3)’s provisions for 
“appropriate equitable relief”).  
 142. See id. at 250 (indicating that a plan actuary is not an affiliated entity with the 
Kaiser Steel Corporation or plan administrator and is not a plan fiduciary despite ERISA’s 
broad definition of that term).  
 143. See id. (noting that the beneficiaries received only limited benefits guaranteed by 
ERISA  section 1322 that were “substantially lower” than the fully vested pensions due 
under the terms of the plan).  
 144. See id. at 251–53 (noting that 502(a)(2) was limited in applicability by its own 
terms to plan fiduciaries).  
 145. See id. at 253–55 (utilizing an argument that appears to incorporate the broader 
definition of “appropriate equitable relief espoused by Justice Brennan in his Russell 
concurrence” and emphasis of ERISA’s roots in common-law trusts found in Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).  
 146. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254–56 (noting that the plaintiffs substantively seek what 
is effectively “compensatory damages” and not “a remedy traditionally viewed as 
‘equitable,’ such as an injunction or restitution).  
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only those “categories of relief that were typically available in equity” were 
feasible, the latter definition required adoption to avoid rendering the 
modifier “equitable” superfluous.
147
 The Court explained that 
“injunction[s], mandamus and restitution” are examples of the typical 
equitable relief made available through section 502(a)(3).
148
 Thus, Mertens 
rejected Justice Brennan’s view that allowed courts to fashion a federal 




The Mertens dissent, authored by Justice White, emphasized ERISA’s 
trust law foundation and criticized the majority opinion for stripping 
“ERISA trust beneficiaries of remed[ies] . . . which they enjoyed . . . [at] 
common-law.”
150
 The dissent argued that the monetary relief should be 
made available under section 502(a)(3) because the “‘equitable remedies’ 
available to a [modern post-merger] trust beneficiary included 
compensatory damages.”
151
 In addition, the dissent disagreed with the 
majority’s belief that the statutory distinction between “equitable” and 
“remedial” relief in section 409(a) represented a congressional intent to 
adopt the majority’s narrow definition.
152
  
                                                                                                     
 147. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 248, 256–59 (reasoning that modern courts sitting in 
equity in an action regarding breach of trust could provide both legal and traditionally 
equitable relief and such a definition would effectively place no limit on the relief available).  
 148. See id. at 256 (providing examples of relief traditionally available in a court of 
equity prior to the merger of law and equity). However, Professor Langbein criticizes the 
Court for failing to place enough focus on ERISA’s trust law roots and the inaccuracy of 
these examples based upon the fact that mandamus was a classic form of writ only available 
in courts of law. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1320–21.  
 149. See supra notes 130–132 (illustrating that Justice Brennan’s articulation of 
equitable relief necessarily encompassed broader remedial concepts than those available in 
pre-merger chancery). 
 150. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 263 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Bruch, 489 U.S. at 114 for the proposition that the Court would not interpret 
ERISA in a way which “would afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries 
than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted”).  
 151. See id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that equity for breach of common-law 
trust sought to make the “breach whole” and  “‘endeavor[ed] as far as possible to replace the 
parties in the same situation as they would have been in, if no breach of trust had been 
committed”). 
 152. See id. at 267–69 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress use both terms to 
convey its intent that the federal courts retained the power to craft whatever relief was 
necessary to make the beneficiary whole and did not intend to restrict the remedies available 
to beneficiaries under common law).  However, the majority countered this point by noting 
that, even if the distinction is “artless” it is meaningful textual distinction that must be 
observed. Id. at 259 n.8 (majority opinion). It is also important to note that neither the 
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4. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson 
While Mertens served as a keystone for defining the scope of 
“appropriate equitable relief,” the Court took another major jurisprudential 
step in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.
153
  The case 
involved a claim by Great-West, the provider of an ERISA plan “stop-loss” 
insurance agreement,
154
 for injunctive and declaratory relief under section 
502(a)(3) to enforce the plan reimbursement provision under which the 
beneficiary was liable for any benefit disbursement that was subsequently 
recovered from a third party.
155
  The proceeds of the tort judgment that the 
plaintiff sought to recover were, pursuant to California law, placed in a 
“Special Needs Trust” for the benefit of the defendant.
156
 
Justice Scalia again authored the five-to-four opinion of the Court, 
which found against Great-West based upon its conclusion that the 
requested relief was, in substance, “legal relief” unavailable under section 
502(a)(3).
157
 Citing his dissent in Bowen, Justice Scalia explained that, 
because the funds sought were in a special needs trust instead of in the 
beneficiary’s possession, the plaintiff effectively sought “legal relief” by 
imposition of personal liability for the plan enrollee’s breach of a legal 
obligation to pay money.
158
 The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
he sought restitution encompassed by section 502(a)(3) by explaining that 
                                                                                                     
majority nor dissent attempted to define “remedial relief.” Id. at 267 (White, J., dissenting).  
 153. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213–18 (2002) 
(denying plaintiff’s requested relief based upon the fact that holding the beneficiary liable 
for a legal obligation to pay with a claim against her general assets was restitution-at-law 
outside section 502(a)(3)’s provision for “appropriate equitable relief). 
 154. See id. at 208 (explaining that the plan had “‘assigned to Great-West all of its 
rights to make, litigate, negotiate, settle, comprise, release or waive’ any claim under the 
reimbursement provision” and that the plan had paid welfare benefits to the beneficiary for 
injuries received in a car accident).  
 155. See id. at 207 (explaining that the included reimbursement provision gives “‘the 
right to recover from the [beneficiary] any payment for benefits’ paid by the plan that the 
beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party” and that the beneficiary recovered a tort 
judgment against the third party involved in the accident). 
 156. See id. (explaining that the “Special Needs Trust” was purposed with caring for the 
beneficiaries future medical expenses and was not under the direct control of the 
beneficiary).  
 157. See id. at 204. 
 158. See id. at 210 (“‘Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, 
injunctions, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff 
are suits for ‘money damages’ . . . [and] seek no more than compensation for [a] loss.”).  
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restitution was a post-merger construct consisting of two distinct categories 
of relief, legal restitution and equitable restitution.
159
 The Court clarified 
that “‘restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law and an 
equitable remedy . . . when ordered in an equity case.’”
160
  As such, claims 
for restitution only constitute “equitable relief” when the plaintiff is able to, 
either in the form of constructive trust or an equitable lien, assert title or 
right to possession of particular funds or property wrongfully in the 
possession of the defendant.
161
 In contrast, when a plaintiff is unable 
identify particular assets, but is still able show grounds for recovering 
money “to pay for some benefit the defendant received,” he has a claim for 
restitution at law in the form of quasi-contract or contract implied-in-law.
162
 
Thus, similar to the Seventh Amendment “historical test” whether a claim 
for restitution is legal or equitable depends on its substance, that is the basis 
of the claim and nature of the underlying remedy, not its form.
163
 Justice 
Scalia explained that this determination would rarely require more than a 
reference to the “standard current works.”
164
  
Both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsberg filed separate dissents in 
Great-West.
165
 Noting that the majority test mirrored the Seventh 
Amendment “historical test,” Justice Ginsberg took issue with the assertion 
that Congress intended to invoke a pre-1791 law and equity inquiry for a 
statute passed in 1974.
166
  Attempting to provide some flexibility in the 
                                                                                                     
 159. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S at 212 (explaining that “[i]n the 
days of the divided bench, restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain 
others in equity”).  
 160. Id. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(Posner, J.)).  
 161. See id. at 213–14 (noting that where “‘the property [sought to be recovered] or its 
proceeds have been dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff’s] claim is only that 
of a general creditor’” and sounds only at law).  
 162. See id. at 213 (explaining that restitution-at-law derived form the common-law 
writ of assumpsit and was considered “legal relief” because it sought to impose mere 
personal liability for a sum of money).  
 163. See id. at 214 (emphasis added).  
 164. See id. at 217 (identifying Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements as 
“standard current works” and nothing that the same inquiry is required in the context of the 
Seventh Amendment).  
 165. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 222–34 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (Justice Stevens wrote separately to discuss what he believed to be Congress’s 
intended meaning of the work “enjoin” as used in section 502(a)(3)(A)).  
 166. See id. at 224–27 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s “fanciful” 
interpretation, when combined with the effects of ERISA’s pre-emption of state causes of 
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Mertens rule, the dissent argued that because Great-West sought a form of 
restitution and restitution is generally available in equity, it should fall 
within the definition of “appropriate equitable relief.”
167
 
5. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services 
The Court applied the Great-West test again, this time reaching the 
opposite conclusion, in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services.
168
 The 
case involved a suit for enforcement of a plan reimbursement provision 
after a beneficiary, to whom the plan had issued benefit payments for 
injuries received in an automobile wreck, recovered $750,000 from a third 
party.
169
 This time, the plan fiduciary brought a claim under section 
502(a)(3) which sought to enforce the terms of the plan and collect 
$74,869.37 of the settlement for the plan beneficiary’s medical expenses.
170
 
While the case was pending before the District Court, the beneficiary 
agreed to place $74,869.37 of the settlement in a separate account held by 
the beneficiary pending final resolution of the issue.
171
 The defendant 
                                                                                                     
action, sacrifices Congress’s stated purpose of  increasing beneficiary protections to an 
“archaic and unyielding doctrine”). 
 167. See id. at 228 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that this interpretation of 
“equitable relief” is consistent with congressional intent and that the Court’s previous 
decision in Mertens was not limited to relief exclusively available in equity). However, 
Justice Scalia countered that such vague notions of congressional intent could not override 
clear statutory language. Id. at 217–18 (majority opinion) (observing that the distinction is 
“specified by statute” and that such specification necessitates the Court’s distinction 
“between law and equity”).  
 168. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 360–63 (2006) (applying 
the same rule from Great-West but finding that the claim was to restitution at equity within 
the scope of section 502(a)(3) because it constituted a traceable claim to funds in the 
defendant’s possession which belonged in good conscious to the plaintiff).   
 169. See id. at 360 (explaining that the beneficiaries, the Sereboffs, received a benefits 
disbursement from the welfare plan administrator pursuant to the plans coverage provisions 
and that the beneficiaries subsequently recovered a monetary award for future medical 
expenses in a tort action).  
 170. See id. at 361 (observing that, because there was no dispute that Mid Atlantic was 
a plan fiduciary and that the suit was to enforce the terms of the plan, the only issue before 
the Court was “whether the relief . . . requested . . . was ‘equitable relief’ under” section 
502(a)(3)(B)).  
 171. See id. at 360 (noting Sereboff’s attorney had already distributed the $750,000 
settlement to the defendants and that, in response to a request of temporary injunctive relief 
by the plan administrator, the parties stipulated to place the money is a special account until 
the case was resolved).  
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argued the remedy sought, enforcement of a contractual obligation to pay 
money, was not “typically available in equity” prior to the merger.
172
 
Chief Justice Roberts authored the opinion of the court, which rejected 
the defendant’s argument and clarified the court’s holding in Great-West.
173
 
After reiterating that the true test of whether relief is “legal or equitable 
depends on ‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim and the nature of the 
underlying remedies sought,”
174
 the Court explained that, unlike the facts in 
Great-West, Mid Atlantic sought reimbursement of specifically identified 
funds which were separate from the defendant’s “general assets.”
175
 As a 
result, while the action was for breach of contract and payment of money, 
the remedy sought was in substance an equitable lien, which is a form of 
restitution that Great-West identified as “typically available in equity.”
176
  
Reflection on the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine addressing 
ERISA’s remedial regime reveals a tension between recognizing what 
appeared to be a congressional intent to preserve pre-merger substantive 
equity’s remedial structure and the remedial social justice motivations that 
inspired the statute’s trust law model.
177
 It was against this backdrop that 
our study case found a constitutional right to a jury trial.
178
 
                                                                                                     
 172. See id. at 364 (arguing that the suit would not have satisfied the “strict tracing 
rules” of equitable restitution prevalent in the days of the divided bench).  
 173. See id. at 363 (explaining that the “Court in [Great-West] did not reject Great-
West’s suit out of hand because it alleged a breach of contract and sought money, but 
because Great-West did not seek to recover a particular fund from the defendant”). 
 174. Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363 (quoting Great-West Life 
& Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)).  
 175. See id. at 362 (explaining that Great-West failed to involve an equitable lien 
because the funds claimed by Great-West were not in a “Special Needs Trust” instead of the 
possession of the beneficiary).  
 176. See id. at 363 (noting that because ERISA provides for “equitable remedies to 
enforce plan terms,” the fact that the action involves a breach of contract is not sufficient to 
prove the relief sought is not equitable). To support this point, the Court cited the pre-merger 
case Barnes v. Alexander to show that the basis of Mid Atlantic’s claim had long been 
recognized as a “familiar rul[e] of equity.” See id. at 363 (quoting Barnes v. Alexander, 232 
U.S. 117, 121 (1914) as proof that it is a “‘familiar rul[e] of equity that a contract to covey a 
specific object even before it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets 
a title to the thing’”). 
 177. See generally supra Parts II & III.  
 178. See generally infra Part IV.  
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IV. A Jury Trial & A Study Case: Hellman v. Catalado
179
 
Theodore J. Hellman, an employee of CPI Corp. (“CPI”) and 
beneficiary of CPI’s 401(k) plan, brought suit as representative plaintiff in a 
“stock-drop” class action against plan administrators, including defendant 
Renato Cataldo, for breach of fiduciary duty.
180
 Because CPI’s pension plan 
involved a defined contribution scheme, the size of the retirement 
disbursement depended upon the investment success of the various 
individual beneficiary accounts.
181
 The complaint alleged that, despite 
knowledge of the company’s poor fiscal condition, the plan administrators 
continued to permit plan beneficiaries to invest their employer contributions 
in CPI common stock, which resulted in a loss of pension benefits.
182
  The 
plaintiff argued that that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties of 
prudence and loyalty, giving rise to liability under section 409(a), when 
they: 
(a) . . . fail[ed] to act to protect the Plan and its participants despite 
knowledge of the CPI’s dire financial condition; (b) . . . continu[ed] to 
offer CPI common stock as an investment option under the Plan when it 
was imprudent to do so; and (c) . . . maintain[ed] the Plan’s pre-existing 




The action sought “an order compelling Defendants to restore to the Plan all 
profits that the participants would have made if the Defendants had not 
breached their fiduciary obligations.”
184
 In addition, the plaintiff requested a 




                                                                                                     
 179. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (concluding that the requested relief was restitution-at-law and that the 
Seventh Amendment requires the availability of the jury trial).  
 180. See id. at *1 (explaining that the relevant plan was an “employee benefit plan” 
within the meaning of ERISA § 3(2)(A) and that the plaintiff proceeded individually and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated).   
 181. See generally supra notes 50–56. 
 182. See Hellman, 2013 WL 4482889, at *1–2 (noting that the plaintiff originally 
brought suit against both CPI Corp. and the plan fiduciaries but the claims against CPI were 
dismissed after CPI declared bankruptcy). 
 183. See id. (citing ERISA §§ 404(a) and 405 as the sources of the breached fiduciary 
obligations).  
 184. Id. at *2.  
 185. Id.  
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Despite prior Eighth Circuit precedent suggesting that ERISA does not 
provide for a jury trial,
186
 the district court concluded that “no . . . precedent 
squarely address[ed] . . . whether the Seventh Amendment affords a 
plaintiff the right to a jury trial where a beneficiary alleges violation of 
fiduciary duties and seeks restitution or money damages from the 
fiduciaries under [section 502(a)(2)].”
187
 The District Court went on to deny 
the Defendants’ motion and conclude that, in light of modern developments 
in ERISA case law, the plaintiff sought legal relief entitled to a jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment.
188
 The district court based its reasoning on 
the Supreme Court’s two-step test in Great-West.
189
 The first prong was 
found to weigh in the favor of equity since, based upon ERISA’s trust law 
foundation, the most analogous “18th-century action[]” would have been a 
common law breach of trust “traditionally within the jurisdiction of courts 
of equity.”
190
 The second “weightier prong” of the test however indicated 
that the plaintiff sought “compensation for a loss resulting from [the] 
Defendants’ [fiduciary] breach.”
191
 Citing Great-West’s statement that a 
“judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a 
sum of money’ in return for ‘some benefit that the defendant had received 
from him’ seeks restitution at law,” the court concluded Hellman failed to 
identify traceable property belong to him in good conscious and, as a result, 
sought legal restitution.
192
  Finally, to distinguish the case from the Eight 
Circuit’s previous finding in In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (1982), in 
which the court found monetary relief turning on a determination of 
                                                                                                     
 186. See In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding no right to a jury 
trial in an action brought under § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3)); see also Langlie v. Onan 
Corp., 192 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999) (evaluating a § 510 claim and stating that “no 
right to a jury trial [exists] under ERISA”).  
 187. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (noting that district courts within the Eighth Circuit had reached 
differing conclusions on the issue).  
 188. See id. at *4–5 (ruling only on the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s 
request for a jury trial and permitting the issue to move forward to trial on the merits).  
 189. See id. at *4 (utilizing the Seventh Amendment Granfinanciera test adopted by 
Great-West as the proper to identify “equitable relief” under ERISA).  
 190. See id. (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 
U.S. 558, 567 (1990) for the as evidence that actions for breach of fiduciary duty “‘were 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity”).  
 191. Id.  
 192. See id. (citing White v. Martin, No. Civ. 99–1447, 2002 WL 598432, at *4 (D. 
Minn. Apr. 12, 2002) as holding that no jury trial right existed under § 502(a)(2) when the 
plan sues a fiduciary for breach of duty in liquidating plan assets, but failed to address it).  
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benefits to be equitable, the district court observed that the action before it 
“turn[ed] on the question of fiduciary duty, not entitlement to benefits.”
193
 
V. Analysis & Critique of Hellman v. Cataldo 
Hellman’s conclusion that stock drop actions seek legal relief entitled 
to a constitutional jury trial gives rise to two questions:
194
  (1) whether the 
monetary recovery can constitute “legal relief” when recoverable only “to 
the plan” instead of “to the plaintiff” and (2) if so, whether the court erred 
in its categorization under Great-West.  
A. Relationship Between Seventh Amendment and ERISA Tests 
Whereas ERISA’s definition of relief “typically available in equity” 
hinges on the basis of the claim and nature of the remedy, the Seventh 
Amendment identifies an analogous pre-merger cause of action prior to an 
investigation of the nature of the recovery sought.
195
 Because the two tests 
effectively undertake the same inquiry and are unlikely to produce differing 
results,
196
 a cause of action determined to be equitable for the purposes of 
                                                                                                     
 193. See Hellman, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4. (utilizing the same reasoning that allowed 
the district court to independently frame the issue presented as uniquely addressing 502(a)(2) 
so as to avoid conflict with prior Eighth Circuit decisions on the availability of an ERISA 
jury trial).  
 194. See generally supra notes 195–261.  
 195. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (finding the action was 
not supported by 502(a)(3) because the cause of action was not on “traditionally available in 
equity”); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) 
(determining that the restitution sought was not traditionally available in equity by looking 
to the basis of the claim and nature of the remedy); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, 
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565–66 (1990) (evaluating whether an action is legal 
relief as foreseen by the Seventh Amendment by utilizing the two step test utilized by the 
Court in  Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987)). 
 196. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 180 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that preserving founding-era provisions, such as the Seventh Amendment meaning 
of “equitable,” does not justify using the same historical analysis to determine its meaning 
under a modern statute passed in 1794). The majority also indicated that the inquiry under 
the test they were establishing in Great-West is the same as in the Seventh Amendment 
context when they listed Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) as an example of other areas 
where the court had relied upon “standard common works” to determine if relief was legal or 
equitable. Id. at 217 (majority opinion). 
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ERISA is also equitable for the purposes of the Seventh Amendment.
197
 It 
logically follows that, because every action must be either equitable or 
legal, an action falling outside of ERISA’s definition of “traditional 




B. Can Relief Restricted “to the plan” be Legal Relief? 
Although the ERISA progeny began with Russell’s restrictive 
interpretation of section 409(a), by 2008, a majority of the cases revolved 
around section 502(a)(3).
199
 The Court eventually revisited its prior 
conclusion that section 502(a)(2) only supports actions brought “by the 
plan” for recovery to the “entire plan” in LaRue v. DeWolf, Boberg & 
Associates.
200
  When faced with the question of whether a defined 
contribution plan participant could hold a fiduciary personally liable under 
502(a)(2) for losses incurred when the administrator failed to follow the 
beneficiary’s investment instructions, the Court explained that “although 
[section] 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries 
distinct form plan injuries, [it] does authorize recovery for fiduciary 
breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual 
account.”
201
 Thus, while Russell is still good law in the direct benefit plan 
context, its narrow holding is not applicable to defined contribution 
plans.
202
 The differing results are justified by the nature of defined 
contribution plans, in which benefit disbursements vary with the investment 
success of individualized accounts instead of invariable distributions from a 
                                                                                                     
 197. See id. (Ginsberg J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s utilization of a test 
similar to the Seventh Amendment similarly freezes the statutory definition of “equity” in a 
similar fashion).  
 198. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989) (defining suits 
involving legal relief as, “in contradiction to those where equitable rights alone are 
recognized”).  
 199. See generally supra Part III.   
 200. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 254–55 (2008) 
(recognizing a shift toward utilization of the defined contribution plan over the defined 
benefit plan).  
 201. Id. at 256.  
 202. See id. at 255 (explaining that the “entire plan” language in Russell was directed at 
plans with a defined benefits payment scheme because administrator misconduct would “not 
affect an individuals’ entitlement to a defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of 
default” to the entire plan.)  
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single-employer held defined benefit fund,
203
 and the fact that the modern 




Justice Thomas authored a concurrence agreeing with the Court’s 
result but criticizing the majority’s reasoning.
205
  He explained that it was 
unnecessary to rely upon ERISA’s contemporary shift towards defined 
contribution plans because the plaintiff stated “a cognizable claim flow[ing] 
from the unambiguous text of [sections] 409 and 502(a)(2).”
206
  As a result, 
because “all assets allocated to the petitioner’s individual account were plan 
assets,” individualized recovery for losses to those individual accounts 
satisfied section 409(a)’s requirement that a “recovery [be] for the plan.”
207
  
The concurrence took care to note that recovery under 502(a)(2) remained 
restricted “to the plan,” which in a defined benefit context includes all 
individually held accounts containing plan assets, and not the beneficiary 
personally.
208
  This language begins to look like an attempt to pre-empt the 
jury trial issue once one realizes that Justice Scalia previously stated that 
“‘[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking . . . to compel the defendant to pay a 
                                                                                                     
 203. See id. at 254 (explaining in defined contribution plans “fiduciary misconduct need 
not threaten the solvency of the entire plan to reduce benefits below the amounts that 
participants would otherwise receive”)  
 204. See id. at 254–55 (noting that the “[d]efined contribution plans dominate the 
retirement plan scene today” and that the holding in Russell’s emphasis on protection the 
“entire plan” from fiduciary misconduct reflects the former landscape). 
 205. See id. at 262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the majority erred in its 
reliance on the “trends in the pension plan market” and “ostensible ‘concerns’ of ERISA’s 
drafters”). 
 206. See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 261–62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “Congress’ 
repeated use of the word ‘any’ in [section] 409(a) clarifies that the key factor” to qualifying 
for the remedial provision “is whether the alleged losses can be said to be losses ‘to the 
plan’”). 
 207. See id. at 262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that a “defined contribution 
plan is not merely a collection of unrelated accounts,” but instead a combination of plan 
“assets . . . held in trust and legally owned by the plan trustees”).  
 208. See id. at 261 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that section 502(a)(2) only 
authorizes recovery “to the plan”). 
458 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 425 (2015) 
 
sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for money damages’”
209
 and that 
“money damages are . . . the classic form of legal relief.”
210
  
The question that naturally arises from the forgoing analysis is whether 
an action seeking lost profits for breach of fiduciary duty can constitute 
legal relief when recovery is limited “to the plan” instead of directly “to the 
plaintiff.”
211
  While LaRue informs us that beneficiaries can “recover for 
fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s 
account,” it does not resolve the question of whether such recovery is the 




In light of the existing Supreme Court precedent, the fact that section 
409 requires recovery “to the plan” should not prevent the action from 
qualifying as “legal relief.”
213
  In fact, the nature of a defined contribution 
plan and the LaRue majority’s analysis suggest that recovery “to the plan” 
and “to the plaintiff” can be considered equivalents.
214
  Because CPI’s plan 
consisted of individual participant accounts subject to individual gains and 
losses instead of a single employer held fund, any monetary recovery is 
directly payable to an individual account.
215
  Because each defined 
                                                                                                     
 209. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) 
(quoting Brown v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918–919 (1988) (emphasis added)); see 
also Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364 (2002) (describing monetary 
relief as equitable restitution only when it seeks a distinguishable set of funds distinct from 
the defendant’s “general assets”). 
 210. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 
255 (1993)). 
 211. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (1974) (providing that the fiduciary shall 
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan); see also LaRue, 552 
U.S. at 256 (finding that section 409, in the defined contribution context, supports an action 
by plan beneficiaries for injuries to plan assets held in their individual accounts but not 
directly addressing the fact that any award would still be required to be paid “to the plan”). 
 212. See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 261 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that a defined benefit 
plan “is not merely a collection of unrelated accounts[,]” but rather the sum of all assets 
allocated for bookkeeping purposes to the participants’ individual accounts); see also 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(34) (defining a “defined contribution plan” as a “plan which provides 
individual accounts for each participant”); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (requiring that “all assets of 
an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees”).  
 213. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (demonstrating 
section 409’s repeated use of the limiting phrase “to the plan”). 
 214. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 16 (“Under a defined contribution plan, all 
amounts contributed to the plan on behalf of an employee are credited to one or more 
accounts in his name.”).  
 215. See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 248 (explaining that section 502(a)(2) authorizes recovery 
for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets held in a participants individual 
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contribution beneficiary necessarily has some “right, title or interest in the 




It is also important to note that the Great-West and Seventh 
Amendment tests hinge on the origin of the money sought and not on the 
ultimate depository of the eventual award.
217
  Specifically, the inquiry 
requires courts look to see if the request sought restoration of “‘particular 
[traceable] funds’ now in the Defendants’ possession”
218
 or funds 
indistinguishable from the defendants’ “general assets.”
219
  Because the 
judgment recipient is never mentioned, the fact that the recovery is limited 
“to the plan” should not have any effect on whether the relief embodied in 
such award is equitable or legal.
220
  
Accepting the above arguments and presuming section 409(a) is found 
to support actions for legal relief, it becomes clear that monetary recovery 
                                                                                                     
account).  
 216. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729, 733 (1978) (finding a 
particular pension plan was not a defined contribution plan because, while a record of 
contributions received to each participant were maintained by the Trustees, participants had 
no right, title or interest in those amounts).  
 217. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) 
(describing the determination of whether an action for monetary relief is equitable or legal as 
focused on whether it merely sought to impose “personal liability” or “traced . . . particular 
funds or property in the defendant’s possession”); see also Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. 
Inc., 547 U.S. 356–58 (2002) (clarifying the focus of the Great-West test and failing to 
mention the ultimate depository of the potential award as relevant to that inquiry).  
 218. Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D. Mo. 
Aug. 20, 2013); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 213 (explaining 
that restitution at law derived from the common-law writ of assumpsit because it sought “to 
obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of 
money”).  
 219. See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 357 (highlighting the fact that the targeted money were 
identifiable, and particular funds within the defendant’s possession distinct from his “general 
assets” as proof the action was equitable).  
 220. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (1974) (providing that the fiduciary shall 
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan (emphasis added)); see 
also LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (finding that 
section 409, in the defined contribution context, supports an action by plan beneficiaries for 
injuries to plan assets held in their individual accounts but not directly addressing the fact 
that any award would still be required to be paid “to the plan”); see also Great-West Life & 
Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 212 (drawing the distinction between restitution at law and 
restitution at equity as based upon the plaintiff’s ability to assert “title or right to particular 
property” and not mentioning the ultimate depository or relief as relevant to such inquiry). 
460 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 425 (2015) 
 
to a participant’s defined contribution account could potentially be, and is 
not inconsistent with, characterization as “legal relief.”
221
  
C. Did the District Court Err in Light of CIGNA Corp. v. Amara? 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s most recent case in CIGNA Corp. v. 
Amara,
222
 lower courts frequently split on the question of whether relief 
sought under sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2) constitutionally require a jury 
trial and demonstrate a wide diversity of reasoning in answering the 
question.
223
  In CIGNA, when faced with the question of whether plan 
beneficiaries could force a plan administrator to distribute benefits in 
accordance with the original terms of an illegally reformed plan, the Court 
suggested in dicta that, because “a suit by a beneficiary against a plan 
fiduciary (whom ERISA typically treats as a trustee) about the terms of a 
plan (which ERISA typically treats as a trust)” would have been actionable 
in equity during the days of the divided bench,
224
 section 502(a)(3)’s catch-
all provision might authorize the necessary relief.
225
  Any accompanying 
remedy would also be equitable due to the fact that “equity chancellors 
developed a host of . . . ‘distinctively equitable’ remedies—remedies that 
were ‘fitted to the nature of the primary right.’”
226
  The Court noted 
ERISA’s trust law origin and explained that monetary recovery in such a 
situation would not necessarily prevent the remedy from constituting 
traditionally equitable relief because “[pre-merger] equity courts possessed 
                                                                                                     
 221. See supra Part V, Section B (examining whether relief which is only payable “to 
the plan” can amount to “legal relief” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment). 
 222. 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). 
 223. Compare Abbot v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-cv-0701-MJR, 2007 WL 
2316481, at *3 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (focusing on the liability arising due to fiduciary breach and 
noting that the “great weight of authority in federal courts hold . . . that ERISA 
actions . . . are equitable in nature for purposes of the Seventh Amendment”), with Chao v. 
Meixner, No. 1:07-cv-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (citing Great-
West as compelling the conclusion that the plaintiff sought legal relief because it fell within 
the rubric of restitution at law).  
 224.  See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1879 (2011) (citing LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 253 (2008)).  
 225. See id. at 1876–77 (concluding that the district court ordered two steps of relief 
and that only the second, enforcing the reformed terms of the plan, was consistent with relief 
available under section 502(a)(1)(B)).  
 226. Id. at 1879 (quoting 1 S. SYMONS, POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 108 (5th 
ed. 1941)).  
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the power to [award] . . . monetary ‘compensation’ for a loss resulting from 
a trustee’s breach of duty.”
227
  Thus, in a suit seeking make whole relief, 
“the fact that the defendant is, unlike the defendant in Mertens, analogous 




LaRue makes clear that Hellman’s request, which sought restoration to 
the Plan of all profits that would have accrued absent the CPI 401(k) plan 
administrators’ failure to follow investment instructions, amounts to an 
action for “lost profits.”
229
  As Part II of this Note explains, whether such 
action constitutes relief “typically available in equity,” i.e., equitable relief 
outside the scope of the Seventh Amendment, depends on a substantive 
examination of the basis of the claim and the nature of the remedy.
230
  
Applying the first prong of this test, it appears that the basis of 
Hellman’s action is the breach of a fiduciary duty.
231
  This conclusion is 
supported by the analysis of Part IB of this Note and the fact that scholars 
have consistently indicated that section 502(a)(2) is grounded in the 
common law of trusts; which traditionally arose in courts of equity during 
the days of the divided bench.
232
  Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of 
                                                                                                     
 227. See id. at 1880 (observing that prior to the merger of law and equity this kind of 
monetary remedy against a trustee, often called a surcharge, was “exclusively equitable”).  
 228. See id.  
 229. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (explaining that the plaintiff seeks “declaratory relief, recovery of 
profits, and the imposition of a constructive trust on funds in Defendants’ possession”); see 
also LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 253 n.4 (2008) (explaining 
that actions for lost profits fall squarely within the scope of relief available under sections 
409(a) and 502(a)(2)); see also ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1974) (“[F]iduciary . 
. . shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from 
each such breach.”(emphasis added)). 
 230. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002) 
(basing its determination that the restitution sought was restitution at law based upon 
analysis of the basis of the claim and the substantive nature of the relief sought); see also 
supra notes 167–82 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Hellman, 2013 WL 4482889, at *1 (describing the claim for lost profits, which 
was the focus of the court’s analysis in determining the applicability of the Seventh 
Amendment, was brought under ERISA section 502(a)(2) for breach of fiduciary duty giving 
rise to personal liability of the fiduciary under section 409(a)).  
 232. See supra Part II, section B; see also CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 
1879 (2011) (explaining that lawsuits by a beneficiary against a fiduciary could have been 
brought only in a court of equity prior to the merger of law and equity); see also Mertens v. 
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 (1993) (recognizing the common law trust foundation of 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty); see also Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, No. 2:07-
cv-666-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 1698352, at *2 (citing Pereria v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 338 
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Next, a consideration of the second factor becomes necessary: 
“whether the nature of the remedy sought is legal or equitable.”
234
  The 
inquiry is consistent with recognition of the fact that, while breach of 
fiduciary duty cases are “historically and substantively equitable,” 
corresponding post-merger remedies “might be legal.”
235
  Because the 
“contours of the term [equitable relief] are well known,” such a 
determination rarely takes more than an examination of the standard current 
works—i.e., “Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements.”
236
  Hellman, 
however, fails to make reference to these materials or Justice Breyer’s dicta 
in CIGNA which suggests an order that requires a fiduciary “compensat[e]” 
a beneficiary for losses resulting from a breach of his duties historically fell 
within a set of “‘distinctively equitable’ remedies . . . that were ‘fitted to the 
nature of the primary right’ they were intended to protect.”
237
  The omission 
is critical because the relief sought, an injunction requiring CPI plan 
administrators to restore profits lost incurred as a result of their fiduciary 
breach, resembles an equitable pre-merger remedy known as a surcharge.
238
  
A comparison of pre-merger trust remedies confirms the error.
239
  
                                                                                                     
(2d Cir. 2005) for the proposition that actions for breach of fiduciary duty were within the 
jurisdiction of equity courts prior to the merger of law and equity); see also Choa v. 
Meixner, No. 1:07-cv-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2007)(“[A]s 
a general rule, breach of fiduciary duty claims were historically within the jurisdiction of the 
equity courts.”); see also Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-cv-0701-MJR, 2007 WL 
2316481, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) (recognizing that the action for breach of fiduciary 
duty had an historically analogous action in pre-merger equity).  
 233. See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1879 (shifting its analysis to the second prong of Great-
West in a way that indicates its conclusion that breach of fiduciary duty actions indicate the 
relief sought is equitable).  
 234. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (emphasis added)).  
 235. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.6(3) 
(2d ed. 1993) (recognizing that courts in the past have found that a plaintiff seeking merely 
to recover monetary relief (assumpsit) or the return of a chattel to which he holds legal title 
(replevin) are restitutionary remedies “at law”).  
 236. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 217 (claiming that this static 
definition will be less confusing that the “rolling revision” of the term “equity” suggested by 
the dissents).  
 237. See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1879–80 (quoting 1 S. SYMONS, POMEROY’S EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 180 (5th ed. 1941)).  
 238. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (applying the second prong of the Great-West test, after determining 
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As the CIGNA majority observed, the fact that an action for lost 
profits “takes the form of a money payment does not [necessarily] remove it 
from the category of traditional equitable relief” because liability from the 
fiduciary defendant’s breach supports a fundamentally and substantively 
equitable remedy.
240
  Specifically, in the days of the divided bench a 
surcharge allowed a trust beneficiary to recover monetary relief from his 
fiduciary for any harm that resulted from that fiduciary’s breach of duty.
241
  
The equitable nature of such recovery is further supported by the standard 
current works, which provide that compensatory payments were frequently 
ordered pursuant to either restitution or in the exercise of equity powers.
242
  
Closer examination reveals that the surcharge remedy stands wholly 
independent from the concept of restitution.
243
  Despite the fact that 
recognition of this fact is fundamental to correct remedial categorization of 
section 409(a)’s lost profits remedy, a proper understanding of the nuanced 
relationship continues to elude many courts.
244
 While pre-merger trust law 
permitted recovery of non-traceable monetary sums in conjunction with the 
restitutionary action of accounting, which frequently took the form of 
interest accrued to traceable property that was itself unreachable by 
constructive trust or equitable lien, several circuits have indicated that 
scope of the “surcharge” remedy extended beyond this context.
245
  One such 
                                                                                                     
that the first prong weighed in favor of equity, without reference to CIGNA).  
 239. See supra Part II, section B (highlighting the trust law foundation of the ERISA 
fiduciary provisions).  
 240. See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1880 (explaining that, prior to the merger of law and 
equity, actions seeking money payment as relief for a loss resulting from a trustee’s breach 
of duty, or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment were “‘exclusively equitable’”). In 
addition, the court noted that the pre-merger court in equity has the “power to . . . surcharge” 
a fiduciary with losses incurred to the plan. Id.  (citing to Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis 
v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 464 (1939)).  
 241. See id. (citing to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201(1957) for support).   
 242. See DOBBS, supra note 235, § 3.1, at 278 n.5 (explaining that some kinds of money 
awards are not traditionally referred to as damages for historical reasons).  
 243. See Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1013 (2004) 
(discussing restitution in the form of “accounting for profits” as a traditionally equitable 
remedy recognized prior to the merger of law and equity within the meaning of ERISA 
“equitable relief”).  
 244. See e.g., Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, No. 2:07-cv-666-FtM-29DNF, 2012 
WL 1698351, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2012) (concluding that the relief sought by the 
409(a)(2) lost profits plaintiffs was equitable in nature because “plaintiffs seek restitution, 
which is typically an equitable remedy”). 
 245. See DOBBS, supra note 235, § 4.3(5), at 608 (noting that accounting of profits 
could recover monetary sums which were not traceable to the defendant’s possession if they 
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example is the fact that all pre-merger actions for breach of fiduciary duty 
supported a “make whole” award of monetary compensation for any profits 
that the trust failed to realize as a consequence of breach.
246
  While the 
recovery of both the accrued interest and lost profits were treated as forms 
of  “‘surcharge’ because [in both instances] the trustee was ‘chargeable’ for 
the recovery on top of the trust balance reflected in his accounting,”
247
 
unlike an action for accounting of profits, which itself is a form of 
restitution, the latter remedy constituted a form of non-restitutionary 
relief.
248
  Thus, while it is true that restitution only “holds the defendant 
liable for his profits . . . [instead of the plaintiff’s] damages,”
249
 monetary 
compensation acquired through surcharge of a fiduciary is not bound by 
this principal because recovery is completely distinct from the concepts of 
restitution and legal relief.
250
  
                                                                                                     
were attributable to the use of property which belonged in good conscious to him); see also 
Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869, 878–880 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that 
CIGNA fundamentally changed the court’s understanding of “equitable relief” available 
under ERISA in that monetary compensation does not automatically mean the remedy is 
“legal” rather than “equitable” and explaining the pre-merger equitable origin of the 
surcharge); see also Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(remanding the case to the district court for consideration of whether the remedy sought in 
substance constitutes surcharge and rejecting the conclusion that all monetary relief is 
outside the scope of “equitable relief”); see also McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 
176 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the district court erred by limiting relief to premiums 
wrongfully withheld by the fiduciary when surcharge “make whole” relief was traditional 
equitable relief); see also Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Ret. Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162, 1167 
(9th Cir. 2012) (describing the surcharge as a remedy capable holding a fiduciary liable for 
either benefits gained through unjust enrichment or compensatory monetary relief for harm 
resulting from its breach).   
 246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 (2012) (“If a breach of trust causes a 
loss, including any failure to realize income, capital gain, or appreciation that would have 
resulted from proper administration, the beneficiaries . . . may have the trustee surcharged 
for the amount necessary to compensate fully for the consequences of the breach.”); see also  
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011)  (describing the lost profits recovery 
as “make whole” relief). 
 247. .See MARY ELLEN SIGNORILLE & RAVEN MERLAU, CIGNA CORPORATION V. AMARA: 
A WHOLE NEW WORLD, ALI-ABA 159, 164 (2011).  
 248. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862 (rev. 2d 
ed. 1995) (“For a breach of trust the trustee may be directed . . . to pay damages to the 
beneficiary out of the trustee’s own funds, either for that purpose or on an accounting where 
the trustee is surcharged beyond the amount of his admitted liability.” (emphasis added)).  
 249. DOBBS, supra note 235, § 4.3(5), at 611. 
 250. See CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., & CHARLES E. ROUNDS, III, LORING AND ROUNDS: A 
TRUSTEES HANDBOOK 698–99 (2014 ed.) (describing the potential monetary liability as either 
damages, restitution, or surcharge and describing surcharge as non-traceable monetary 
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The development of an “exclusively equitable” source of 
compensatory relief is not surprising because, for much of the trust’s 
existence, equity was the sole forum to recognize the trust relationship.
251
 
As a result, recognition of surcharge as a stand-alone substantive form of 
traditionally equitable relief stays true to both the trust law foundation of 
section 409(a) and allays Justice White’s fears by ensuring that ERISA’s 
remedial provisions are not read to afford the beneficiary with less 
protection than he would have had prior to 1974.
252
 Instead, revival of the 
surcharge remedy gives ERISA beneficiaries access to the same form of 
trust based compensatory relief that would have been available to pension 
participants prior to 1974 without the mental contortion courts frequently 
undertook prior to Great-West.
253
 Recognition of such an award is also 
consistent with the Court’s earlier denial of compensatory “make whole” 




Because surcharge, unlike the restitution, does not sit on the line of 
law and equity, Great-West’s distinction between claims to traceable 
property versus claims against general assets is not relevant to 
categorization of the 502(a)(2) stock drop action.
255
 However, since both 
                                                                                                     
compensation for losses incurred from breach of fiduciary duty).  
 251. See supra Part II.B.  
 252. See supra notes 1157–59 (identifying two major trends in the ERISA remedial 
scheme and highlighting Justice Whites’ major contention in his Mertens dissent that 
explained compensatory relief was available in post-merger pre-ERISA trust actions); see 
also Langbein, supra note 23, at 1350–51 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s statements in Russell 
and Mertens—specifically that monetary relief was legal relief not available as “appropriate 
equitable relief”—were overly generalized and incorrect because some monetary awards 
were exclusively equitable).  
 253. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1361–62 (explaining that “[u]ntil Great-West, 
some courts had strained to grant consequential relief despite the holding in Mertens by 
characterizing the relief as restitution—for example, by treating as restitutionary the 
recovery of interest on a benefit payment long delayed”). 
 254. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011) (explaining that, 
“unlike the defendant in Mertens, [the current defendant] is analogous to a trustee [and 
therefore] makes a critical difference”).  
 255. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 
(2002) (explaining that relief falling under the rubric of restitution can be either legal or 
equitable); DOBBS, supra note 235, § 4.1(2), at 556 (explaining that restitution sits on the 
line between law (replevin & assumpsit) and equity (constructive trust, equitable lien, 
accounting)); see also CIGNA Corp.,131 S. Ct. at 1880 (explaining that, unlike restitution in 
which monetary claims were usually at law, a “monetary remedy against a trustee . . . was 
‘exclusively equitable.’”). 
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the Mertens and Seventh Amendment inquiries still require a substantive 
examination beyond remedial labels,
256
 section 409(a)’s lost profits remedy 
is only “exclusively equitable” in the eyes of the Seventh Amendment 
where the defendant was a fiduciary in breach of a fiduciary duty and the 
lost profits compensate for losses to the plan that resulted from such 
breach.
257
 The equitable nature of Hellman’s relief is confirmed when this 
standard is applied to the study case. Despite the fact that any potential 
monetary recovery would be solely recoverable from the defendant’s 
general assets, Hellman was able to establish that the administrator was a 
plan fiduciary, a breach of duty resulted in the loss of his 401(k), and that 
the requested relief compensates a “failure to realize income, capital gain, 




Finally, the forgoing analysis should survive the CIGNA dissent’s 
skeptical citation to Knieriem v. Group Health Plan
259
 because the case 
dealt only with the question of whether the relevant facts merited surcharge 
in conjunction with a restitutionary accounting of profits and completely 
failed to evaluate whether surcharge as a standalone non-restitutionary 
equitable remedy.
260
 Because ERISA is grounded in pre-merger trust law 
                                                                                                     
 256.  See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 211–14 (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s characterization of the requested relief based upon a substantive inquiry in the 
actual nature of the relief requested); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. 
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (explaining that the second prong of the “historical test” 
requires an examination of the nature of the relief requested). 
 257. Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869, 880–82 (7th Cir. 2013) (basing 
its description of the elements necessary for a prayer to substantively constitute surcharge on 
the Supreme Court’s description in CIGNA).  
 258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95(b) (2012) (explaining that surcharge 
included both amounts charged in excess of traceable property identified in an accounting 
and independently for losses incurred by the trust due to fiduciary breach); see also Princess 
Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1939) (finding that a remedy 
seeking to hold a plan fiduciary personally liable for losses to a trust plan resulting from plan 
mismanagement was a remedy within the court’s equitable jurisdiction).  
 259. See 434 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that 
the remedy he sought, “restitution and surcharge” for alleged breach of fiduciary duty in 
denying medical benefits, constituted a surcharge awardable in equity).  
 260. See id. at 1063 (explaining that the plaintiff argued that the surcharge was 
available because it had been awarded under a similar fact pattern in Parke v. First Reliance 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1994)).  The Eighth Circuit rejected this 
argument, reasoning that “Knieriem misapplie[d] Parke.” Id.  The court explained that, 
unlike the plaintiff in Knieriem, the Parke case involved a claim for payment of prejudgment 
interest under a 502(a)(1)(B) action for accounting of profits.  Id.  Contrary to the plaintiff’s 
alleged meaning, Parke was found to only stand for the proposition that an accounting of 
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and Hellman’s requested remedy mirrors an equitable surcharge “brought 
for [its own] purpose,” unrelated to the restitutionary claims accounting of 
profits, constructive trust, equitable lien, or quasi-contract, the district court 





While the rise of the defined contribution plan provides several 
advantages, such as increased plan control, unique plan portability, and 
potentially higher investment returns, it also revives some of the socially 
unjust administrative risks prevalent in the pre-1974 pension system.
262
 For 
example, making retirement security dependent on the sophistication of 
participant investors places low-income and low education households at 
higher risk of retirement insecurity because they lack expertise to evaluate 
the prudence of employer provided portfolios or financial flexibility to 
establish alternative retirement savings.
263
 Higher household risk combined 
with an aging population’s increased reliance on the private pension system 
increased the frequency stock drop class actions.
264
 Questions regarding 
                                                                                                     
profits, which is a traditionally equitable remedy invoked in conjunction with constructive 
trust, included the disgorge of fiduciary profits when the wrongful conduct constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  Id.  However, Knieriem failed to address the independent 
applicability of surcharge as an equitable remedy distinct from restitution.  Id.  
 261. BOGERT, supra note 248; see also supra Part II, section B (discussing the contours 
of equitable and legal remedies and the impact such categorization has on questions of 
Seventh Amendment jury trial availability). 
 262. See PERUN & STEUERLE, supra note 103, at 6 (noting modern ERISA system 
supports larger investment earnings ($117 billion for defined contribution plans and $41 
billion for defined benefit plans) and “pa[ys] out more in benefits ($98 billion for defined 
contribution plans and $85 billion for defined benefit plans),” but noting that all returns are 
employee driven).  
 263. See JOHN BROADBENT, MICHAEL PALUMBO, & ELIZABETH WOODMAN, THE SHIFT 
FROM DENIED BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS—IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ASSET ALLOCATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT ii (2006), available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/wgpapers/cgfs27broadbent3.pdf (explaining that the shift from 
defined benefit to defined contribution plans means shifting the risk of loss from 
shareholders to households, and that plan participants in both developed and emerging 
pension markets are more exposed to risks in the financial market).  
 264. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that more than 200 ERISA employer 
“stock drop” class action lawsuits have been filed alleging that plan fiduciaries breach their 
ERISA duties of prudence and loyalty by allowing participants to invest in employer stock).  
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Despite Mertens’s and Great-West’s narrowing definition of 
“traditional equitable relief,” a substantive examination of the stock drop 
action reveals that the elusive ERISA jury trial remains unavailable.
266
 In 
light of the Supreme Court’s holding in LaRue, which permitted 
beneficiaries to recover for injuries to their individualized defined 
contribution accounts, it is unclear whether a section 502(a)(2) stock drop 
class action should fail to constitute “legal relief” based upon section 
409(a)’s restriction of recovery “to the plan” instead of “to the plaintiff” 
alone.
267
 However, even if recovery to individualized employer-held 
accounts could constitute legal relief, our case study of Hellman reveals that 
section 502(a)(2) “stock drop” actions nonetheless seek typically equitable 
relief.
268
 This is because the surcharge is a distinctly equitable remedy 
wholly independent from the concept of “legal relief” or post-merger 
concept of restitution.
269
 Hellman’s section 502(a)(2) “stock drop” 
recovery, despite not being requested in conjunction with an accounting of 
profits, still constitutes a surcharge brought “for [its own] purpose.”
270
 
Finally, because the Supreme Court’s narrowed definition of ERISA 
“equitable relief” parallels the pre-merger law and equity distinction of the 
Seventh Amendment “historical test,” it follows that Hellman’s section 
502(a)(2) stock drop action for recovery of section 409(a) lost profits is not 
constitutionally entitled to the availability of a jury trial.
271
 
                                                                                                     
 265. See supra Part V.  
 266. See supra Part III.B.  
 267. See supra Part V.B (determining that the similar nature of recovery “to a plan” and 
“to the plaintiff” after LaRue should not be found to prevent the remedy’s categorization as 
legal relief).  
 268. See supra Part V.C (explaining that the basis of the claim and nature of the remedy 
sought in Hellman’s stock drop action were “traditionally available in equity”); see also 
PERUN & STEUERLE, supra note 103, at 6 (explaining that defined contribution participants 
bear more risk than defined benefit participants due to their investment control). 
 269. See supra Part V.C (explaining the deficiencies and omissions of the Knieriem 
opinion cited by Justice Scalia’s dissent in CIGNA). 
 270. See supra Part V.C (referencing treatises and “standard current works” to conclude 
that the equitable surcharge is an independent distinctively equitable remedy).  
 271. See supra Part V.A (explaining the similarities between the two tests and 
concluding that it is impossible to reach differing determinations whereby a claim is 
equitable under one and legal under the other). 
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Resurrection of the surcharge partially remedies Justice White’s 
concern that the Court was ignoring ERISA’s remedial purpose in denying 
compensatory liability, but necessarily means that plan participants lack the 
extra protection of a jury trial.
272
 While the jury trial would have probably 
provided some peace of mind, it is important to remember that its absence 
does not mean defined contribution plan enrollees are helpless.
273
  Any 
advantage provided by a jury trial would have only been relevant as a last 
line of defense for plan losses already incurred and there might be an 
advantage to keeping complicated ERISA actions before experienced 
judges that are more likely to be familiar with the statute’s complexities.
274
 
The unavailability of the jury trial should only serve as additional incentive 
for plan participants to attempt to educate themselves on reliability of 
employer provided investment options, establish independent personal 
savings whenever possible, and invest conservatively.
275
 In addition to self-
help, Congressional legislation requiring that defined contribution plans 
secure independent investment advice for enrollees or employ third party 
advisors to govern the availability of company stock options would honor 
ERISA’s social justice origins by protecting the low-income households 
most threatened by new participant driven scheme.
276
 Reforms like these, 
                                                                                                     
 272. See supra Part III.B (explaining that a narrower construction might deprive 
participants of compensatory relief that would be available if they had brought to action as a 
breach of trust prior to 1974).  
 273. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 2 (demonstrating that, despite the rarity of the jury 
trial, plan participants are bringing an increased number of stock-drop complaints and 
tagalong securities fraud complaints against companies and their executives).  
 274. See PERUN & STEUERLE, supra note 103, at 4 (listing the complexity arising from 
ERISA’s many rules, uncertainty arising from the ambiguity of statutory test, and 
inconsistency arising from a plethora of exceptions as some the problems non-experts have 
with the statute).  
 275. See BROADBENT, PALUMBO & WOODMAN, supra note 263, at 40–41 (listing inertia, 
procrastination, and myopia as suggesting improvement in “financial literacy” and as a 
potential path to improving returns and improving retirement security).  
 276. See id. at 38 (explaining that “a large body of research . . . demonstrates that 
financial planning and investing for retirement is not something that comes easily to most 
people” and that “financial literacy surveys find that many individuals lack even the basic 
knowledge required to successfully manage their own retirement plans”); see also 
VANGUARD CONSULTING, supra note 8, at 6 (explaining that investment loss on employer 
provided stock options is increased when employers place high-level corporate officials with 
potential conflicting interests on the review board in charge of ensuring portfolio reliability); 
Tim Kohn & Warren Cormier, How to Improve the Experience of Defined Contribution 
Participants, DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS 1, 8 (2011), available at 
http://www.dfaus.com/pdf/DC_Experience.pdf (listing “get professional-grade help for your 
participants” as a way to improve retirement security under defined contribution plans).  
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which decrease the need for safety valve litigation by reducing 
administrative risk, will do more for retirement stability and comfort of 
mind than any jury.
277
 
                                                                                                     
 277. See BROADBENT, PALUMBO & WOODMAN, supra note 263, at 39–41 (listing several 
other researcher-developed ideas for ways to change the structure of administrative 
programs to improve the retirement security “for a large number of workers under [deified 
contribution] and 401(k)-type pension plans”).  
